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Examining the Relationships between Labour Market Mismatches, 
Earnings and Job Satisfaction among Immigrant Graduates in Europe 
 
Introduction  
To date, the position of immigrants in the labour market has attracted considerable 
attention within the literature (Lindley, 2009; Kucel and Byrne, 2008; Dex and Lindley, 2007; 
Battu and Sloane, 2004; Alpin et al., 1998; Blackaby et al., 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005; Bell, 
1997; Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Chiswick, 1980). These studies have produced conflicting 
findings regarding the labour market outcomes of immigrant groups. On the one hand, a 
body of work has empirically demonstrated that immigrants and specific ethnic minority 
groups occupy an unequal and disadvantaged position in the labour market in terms of 
higher unemployment rates, lower earnings and higher rates of overeducation (Blackaby et 
al., 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005; Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Alpin et al., 1998; Battu and Sloane, 
2004; Kucel and Byrne, 2008; Messinis, 2008a, 2008b; Lindley, 2009, Nelison, 2011). 
However, a number of studies have also found that, on average, immigrants perform better 
than natives in the labour market in terms of both higher employment and earnings (Bell, 
1997; Clark and Lindley, 2005). Nevertheless, within those studies reporting that immigrants 
perform better, clear ethnic differences exist, with non-white immigrants tending to perform 
poorly relative to both white natives and white immigrants (Clark and Lindley, 2005).  
 
Explanations for higher rates of educational mismatch among immigrants tend to centre on 
labour market discrimination. If immigrant groups find it more difficult to acquire a suitable 
job, they may well be more likely to take a job that is not commensurate with their 
qualifications, resulting in higher proportions being overeducated. With the level of 
educational attainment rising amongst immigrant groups as a whole, discrimination, if 
reflected in greater levels of mismatch and thus lower earnings and job satisfaction, may 
place doubts on the importance of human capital attainment as an avenue for escaping 
disadvantage (Leslie and Drinkwater, 1999). In contrast, others argue that such differentials 
in levels of mismatch may be observed without necessarily attributing this to labour market 
discrimination (Lindley, 2009). There may be differences in the ‘quality’ of education 
received in terms of subjects, grades and institutions attended (Bhattacharoversk, Ison and 
Blair 2003; Jones and Elias, 2005); furthermore, in many studies, differences in language 
skills are not observed. Finally, immigrant education may be location specific with respect to 
their home labour market, which will also impact on levels of labour market progression 
within the host labour market.  
 
This paper contributes to the current immigration literature on a number of levels. To begin 
with, it considers and compares the labour market position of immigrants and natives within 
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a group of 11 European countries1, controlling for time since arrival, using high quality 
graduate cohort data. By considering the outcomes of graduates from European universities 
who have stayed to work in the country of graduation post-study, it is arguably substantially 
reduces many of the biases associated with previous studies in relation to (a) quality 
differences in the education of immigrants, (b) location specific human capital effects and (c) 
unobserved language differences.  
 
Immigration research has consistently pointed to the importance of the location in which 
the human capital was acquired; in the country of origin or in the host country. To date, a 
small number of studies have emphasised the differential returns to location-specific human 
capital, with human capital that is acquired in the host country demonstrating higher returns 
(Bell, 1997; Shields and Wheatley Price, 1998). While previous studies may have restricted 
exploration of the labour market position of immigrant minority groups to those who have 
attained native qualifications (see for example Lindley, 2009), this study provides a more 
ready comparison of a homogenous population, comparing like with like, by focusing on 
similarly aged/experienced entrants to graduate labour market. Furthermore, as the 
graduates in this study have successfully completed third-level qualifications in the host 
country, we can confidently assume that language difficulties are much less of a factor. The 
paper also extends the literature on the labour market position of immigrants with respect 
to both education and skill mismatch. Finally, this research provides more rigorous 
econometric testing of labour market outcomes in relation to the incidence of mismatch, 
wages and job satisfaction. Few studies have accounted for selectivity bias or unobserved 
heterogeniety and, while arguably, such factors are less of an issue within such a relatively 
homogenous sample, it is still important that they are considered2.  
 
In terms of labour market outcomes, our primary goal is to determine the degree to which 
immigrants experience higher rates of job mismatch relative to natives and the extent to 
which such exposures exacerbate existing differentials with respect to both earnings and job 
satisfaction.  
Data and Methods 
The Flexible Professional in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX) project was financed as a 
Specific Targeted Research Project (STREP) of the European Union’s Sixth Framework 
Programme covering 15 countries. It is limited to graduates in the 1999/2000 academic year, 
who were interviewed five years later in 2005. We focus on graduates from the EU member 
states of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain and the UK thus excluding observations from the Czech Republic, Estonia and Japan. 
                                                     
1 Irish authorities choose not to participate in the study. 
2 for exceptions see Blackaby et al., 2002 
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To date all studies of mismatch and immigration \ ethnicity have focused exclusively on 
overeducation, however, there is an emerging strand of literature which argues that 
overskilling is a much more dependable measure of mismatch (Mavromaras et al., 2010, 
Mavromaras et al., 2012, Mavromaras & McGuinness, 2013 McGuinness and Wooden, 
2009). Overeducation has been criticised on the grounds that it represents a relatively 
imprecise measure of human capital mismatch, whereby education proxies individual human 
capital and job entry requirements proxy the skill requirements of the job. Clearly individual 
human capital can be accumulated through both formal and informal means, thus 
overeducation ignores skills acquired while on-the-job. Similarly, in a world of rising 
educational attainment and credentialism, job entry requirements represent an increasingly 
imprecise measure of job complexity.  It has also been argued that overeducated workers 
may be of lower ability and that the observed pay penalty merely reflects this, suggesting 
that studies of overeducation are heavily affected by unobserved individual heterogeneity 
bias.  Arguably overskilling, which directly compares actual human capital, whether that be 
acquired formally or informally or related to innate ability, with actual job requirements 
overcomes all of the measurement problems associated with overeducation and, is 
therefore, potentially a much more robust measure of mismatch.  Within the context of 
studies of immigration, the use of skill mismatch is particularly advantageous as language 
abilities should be encompassed within individual responses, thus lessening the impacts of 
unobserved bias within the measure.  In the data immigrant status is identified on the basis 
of a question on the respondents country of birth. 
 
In terms of the individuals selected for this study, we restrict our sample to employees 
domiciled within EU 15 countries who were in full-time study prior to graduation.  This 
leaves us with an effective sample of 15,005, with individual country samples varying from 
2,296 for the Netherlands to 360 in Portugal.  Immigrants account for 3.31 per cent of the 
sample, which equates to just under 500 effective observations. There exists a substantial 
variation in the immigrant share across countries, ranging from under 1 per cent in Italy 
Portugal and Belgium to over 9 per cent in the UK, with the remaining country immigrant 
shares ranging from 1.7 to 4.6 per cent. It is important to reiterate that the sample is 
representative of the population of host educated immigrant graduates active in the native 
labour market, as opposed to the population of all immigrants per se. Within the data 
individuals were defined as overeducated if they indicated that a below tertiary level of 
education was most appropriate for the job. Overskilling was based on the response to a 
question asking individuals to rate on a 1 to 5 scale3 the extent to which their skills and 
knowledge were utilised in their work with a response of 1 or 2 deemed consistent with 
overskilling.  
                                                     
3  Where 1 was ‘not at all’ and 5 to ‘a very high extent’. 
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An obvious advantage of our dataset is that it enables us to study the relative impacts of 
both overeducation and overskilling among immigrant and native graduates controlling for 
the effects of educational quality, location specific human capital and language difficulties.  
The main drawback of the data is does not allow us to disaggregate our data in terms of 
ethnic background4.  Nevertheless, we believe that the study makes an important 
contribution on the grounds of the uniqueness of the sample and the robustness of the 
estimates presented. In terms of the methods adopted, we add to the traditional analysis of 
this topic by including a range of checks and controls for the influences of sample selection 
and unobserved heterogeneity bias.   
Results 
Table 1 reports the incidence of graduate overeducation and overskilling within our sample 
of countries. At between 2 and 3 per cent, overeducation rates were lowest in Belgium and 
Norway and highest in Spain, the UK and Italy where rates ranged from 13 to 17 per cent.   
The country level distribution of overskilling was somewhat different, with Spain and France 
exhibiting the highest rates and Portugal and Norway the lowest.  Nevertheless, with the 
exception of France and Belgium where the rates of overskilling substantially exceeded 
those for overeducation, there appears a relatively strong relationship between the 
incidences of overeducation and overskilling within countries. However, this is not to say 
that the same individuals are simultaneously identified as mismatched under each measure, 
in fact, we found that just 49 per cent of overeducated graduates were also overskilled, 
while 43 per cent of overskilled graduates where also overeducated.  This reinforces the 
view that both measures of mismatch are likely to be very different in nature (see 
Mavromaras et al (2010) & McGuinness & Sloane (2011)), thus justifying their separate 
analysis with respect to their relationship with immigration status. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
With respect to our multivariate analysis, we begin by assessing the extent to which 
immigrant graduates educated within the host country are prone to educational and skills 
mismatch. The data enables us to refine our definition of immigrants in some important 
ways; firstly; we can control for time since arrival as the questionnaire asks whether the 
individual lived in the host5 country at age 16. Accordingly, 65 per cent of our immigrant 
sample was designated as “established immigrants” with the balance subsequently referred 
to as “new immigrants”. Secondly, the data contains information on country of origin, 
however, as is evident from table A1, the distribution is highly dispersed and requires some 
aggregation to be of any use within an econometric framework.  We subsequently group the 
country of origin variable into the following categories (a) EU  15 (b)  EU accession states (c) 
                                                     
4  A question on  ethnicity was asked for the UK portion of the sample alone. 
5  In this instance host country refers to the country within which the survey is conducted.  
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high income countries6 and (d) the rest of the world.  We begin by estimating three 
specifications to test for the sensitivity of the estimates to immigrant definition applied.  Our 
models contain a range of controls related to faculty of study, years spent in higher 
education. field mismatch, employment history, employer characteristics and country level 
fixed effects. The models relate to employment status five years after graduation and the 
results for the overeducation equation are presented in table 2. 
 
The model reveals that an individual’s single most important determinant of overeducation 
in current employment is overeducation in their first job, thus confirming earlier research 
that supports the notion of overeducation as a non-transitory phenomenon (see 
Mavromaras & McGuinness, 2012). Interestingly, current overeducation was negatively 
associated with initial overskilling although the marginal effects are very low.  With respect 
to the other variables in the model, overeducation was found to be positively correlated 
with previous unemployment and job mobility7 and inversely related to years of HE study, 
field mismatch, participation in a degree programme perceived as prestigious, supervisory 
responsibilities, hours worked, employment in an R&D intensive firm and employment in a 
small firm.  After accounting for such effects, relative to the base case of Germany, 
overeducation was higher in Italy and Austria and lower in France, the Netherland, the UK, 
Norway and Belgium. Regarding the mismatch variables, crucially, there was no evidence to 
suggest that graduates from an immigrant background were more likely to be overeducated, 
with the result holding when time since arrival and country of origin was controlled for.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
On the grounds that relationships may vary according to gender we re-estimated the 
overeducation models for males and females separately (Table 3)8.  The overall immigrant 
variable and those controlling for time since arrival and country of origin were again 
insignificance. The results from tables 2 and 3 suggest that, contrary to the findings of 
previous research, immigrant graduates are not prone to higher risks of overeducation in 
models that fully control for the impacts of location specific human capital and language 
differences, suggesting that previous studies may have been prone, at least to some degree, 
to individual unobserved heterogeneity bias.  
 
The results of the overall overskilling model are reported in Table 4. The model results are 
                                                     
6  Australia, Canada, US, Switzerland and New Zealand. 
7  As measured by the number of previous employers.  This finding supports the view that increased mobility 
levels among mismatched workers often result in the individual moving from one state of mismatch to 
another (McGuinness (2003), McGuinness & Wooden (2009)).   
8  For the purposes of brevity, we report only the key coefficients.  Full results are available from the authors 
on request.  
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similar to those for overeducation, with overskilling in first employment again proving to be 
the most important determinant of current overskilling. The incidence of overskilling was 
found to be higher among males, older workers and those with a history of unemployment, 
while it was inversely related to labour market experience, field mismatch, course prestige, 
perceived course reputation among employers, R&D intensity, public sector employment 
and having a supervisory role. With respect to country level effects, after controlling for 
individual level differences, only Finland was found to have a lower rate of overskilling 
relative to the base case of Germany. In contrast to overeducation, we found that 
immigrants were 3 per cent more likely to be overskilled relative to native graduates, with 
specification 2 indicating that the disadvantage relates exclusively to immigrants who had 
been domiciled in the host country at the age of 16.  This is certainly a somewhat surprising 
result on the grounds that this grouping is likely to have been the most assimilated and are 
also likely to have undertaken second level schooling in the host country.  Finally, 
specification 3 shows a higher overskilling risk among immigrants from EU 15 member 
states. The gender specific equations (Table 59) indicate that the observed effects relate 
specifically to female immigrants, with those domiciled within the host country at the age of 
16 experiencing a 4 percent increased probability of being overskilled in employment five 
years following graduation (relative to native female graduates).  Given that we have, 
arguably largely eliminated many of the usual concerns related to both the nature of 
acquired human capital and language competencies from our estimates, these finding raise 
some significant concerns with respect to labour market access among established female 
immigrants. As a next step, it would be useful to assess the extent to which the findings are 
related to ethnic minority status, however, as stated, this was not possible using this data.  
 
We sought to check that our estimates of the incidence of overeducation and overskilling 
were not affected by selection bias, i.e. the possibility that the observable characteristics of 
immigrants were not distributed in a non-random fashion with respect to mismatch.  Failure 
to account for such influences can result in naive probit models, such as those presented in 
Tables 2 to 5, generating biased estimates. Within the existing literature linking mismatch 
with immigrant status, the issue of selection has been largely ignored. We consequently 
estimate the likelihood of mismatch among immigrants relative to natives with similar 
observable characteristics, and thus similar probabilities of mismatch, using propensity score 
matching (PSM). Due to sample size problems, it was only possible to assess the robustness 
of the overall immigrant coefficients for males and females as any further disaggregation, 
according to either date of arrival or country of origin, was not feasible.  The first stage of 
the PSM revealed that immigrants tended to be older, have fewer years labour market 
experience, spent fewer years in higher education and were less likely to complete a degree 
programme that was perceived to be prestigious.  However, perhaps crucially, they were not 
                                                     
9  For the purposes of brevity, we report only the key coefficients.  Full results are available from the authors 
on request.  
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more likely to be overeducated or overskilled in their initial employment, suggesting that 
they did not have a higher exposure to the key determinant of mismatch in current 
employment10.  The results generated under the Nearest Neighbour algorithm indicate that 
immigrants are around 4 per cent more likely to be overskilled with the impact more 
pronounced within the female labour market. The PSM estimate correspond closely to the 
key estimates from the probit models, suggesting that, at least in relation to the incidence of 
mismatch, selection bias is not an issue (Table 6).   
 
The reliability of any propensity score matching estimate is dependent upon the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA) being met i.e. that selection to the treatment is based solely 
on observables within the dataset and that all variables that simultaneously impact both the 
treatment and outcome variable are also observed.  Given the richness of our models, we 
are confident that the variables at hand sufficiently describe immigrant characteristics. 
Nevertheless, despite the richness of our data, it is not possible to completely rule out the 
possibility that our estimates are unaffected by one or more unobserved effects that 
simultaneously influence both the treatment and outcome variables.  As a final check we ran 
the MHBOUNDS procedure in STATA on the overskilling estimate for all immigrants to assess 
its robustness to potential unobserved confounding factors that simultaneously impact the 
probability of both overskilling and immigrant status.  We begin with the assumption of zero 
bias i.e. Γ = 1. The intuition here is that the results are robust to unobservables that 
positively impact both the likelihood of immigration status and an overskilling and 
subsequently increase the odds ratio of immigration (termed positive selection bias)  up to a 
factor of 1.15 ( Γ = 1.15). Thus, while our analysis suggests that our key overskilling estimates 
are not prone to selection bias, it is also clear that they will relatively quickly become 
unreliable in the presence of any substantial unobserved confounding influence11.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Having established that immigrants do not have higher probabilities of overeducation but 
are somewhat prone to a higher risk of overskilling, we next test the hypothesis that 
graduates from immigrant backgrounds incur larger pay and job satisfaction penalties when 
overeducated and overskilled. Within the general mismatch literature a general pattern has 
emerged of higher pay penalties associated with overeducation relative to overskilling, with 
overskilling associated with a much larger negative impact on job satisfaction (Mavromaras 
et al, 2010).  This has led some authors to conclude that an aspect of the overeducation pay 
differential may relate to a compensating wage differential with workers trading lower 
                                                     
10  Results available from the authors. 
11  Results available from the authors. 
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wages for other aspects of the job that enhance individual lifestyles (McGuinness & Sloane, 
2011).  The large impact of overskilling on job satisfaction has led to suggestions that this 
represents a more genuine form of mismatch (Mavromaras et at, 2013).  It is clearly 
necessary to examine the relative impacts of mismatch on both job satisfaction and wages in 
order to achieve a concise picture of the extent to which workers are being constrained by 
the phenomenon. 
 
The issue of selection bias is again considered and, given that we have observed that 
immigrants tend to be older, have lower levels of labour market experience and less likely to 
have completed a prestigiously perceived degree programme, it seems that sample selection 
bias represents a more substantial risk in the context of the wage equation. To date, 
propensity score matching has been used to test the robustness of estimates of 
overeducation and overskilling on earnings (Mavromaras et al, (2007, 2008), McGuinness 
(2007), McGuinness & Sloane (2011). However, given that we are interested in variations of 
any wage / job satisfaction penalty in terms mismatch status for immigrants relative to 
native, propensity score matching is no longer appropriate due to the problem of small 
sample size among the various treatment groups.  
 
In addition to the problem of sample selection, the issue of unobserved heterogeneity bias 
has been widely discussed within the literature both within the context of education \ skill 
mismatch and immigration.  While we are confident by restricting our analyses to graduates 
of native universities and using of skills mismatch as a key variable we overcomes many of 
the usual omitted variable problems, additional checks are still undertaken. It has been 
argued that, within the context of graduate cohort data, where respondents tend to be very 
similar in terms of both their education and labour market experience profiles, that quantile 
regression may provide a solution to any outstanding missing variables problem 
(McGuinness & Bennet (2007). Following the rationale of McGuinness & Bennet (2007), we 
argue that unobserved differences in the human capital levels of (a) mismatched workers 
due to, for example, lower ability or (b) immigrants due, for example, to poor language skills, 
will be reflected in their position within the wage distribution which will reflect differences 
in graduates levels of human capital.  By comparing the impacts of immigration and 
mismatch within quantiles of the graduate cohort wage (human capital) distribution, we are 
limiting the impacts of unobserved heterogeneity. The quantile regression model can be 
formally written as follows (see Buchinsky, 1994). 
          with     ( )ln |i i iQuant w x xφ φβ=    (1) 
 
Where ix  is a vector of exogenous variables.  ( )ln |i iQuant w xφ denotes the thφ conditional 
quantile of w given x.  The thφ regression quantile, 0<φ <1, is defined as the solution to the 
problem: 
ln i i iw x uφ φβ= +
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The above equation is usually written as: 
( )min lnk i i
i
R w xφ φβε ρ β−∑
                              (3) 
 
Where ( )eρΦ is the check function defined as ( )e eρ φΦ = if 0ε ≥ or ( ) ( 1)e eφρ φ= −  if ε
<0. 
 
It should be noted that the median estimator of 0.5φ = is a special case of the quantile 
regression method.  The method is most usefully thought of as providing a parsimonious 
way of describing the wage distribution and as such it has the potential to add significantly 
to any empirical analysis should the relationship between the regressors and the exogenous 
variables evolve across the conditional wage distribution. We also again control for sample 
selection within this framework, we follow Buchinsky (2001) by implementing a two stage 
approach, whereby step one involves estimating a selection models for both established and 
new immigrants using a semi-nonparametric estimator12 and, in step 2, we augment the 
quantile regressions with level and squared terms of the inverse mills ratios derived from 
step 1. 
 
From a practical perspective, to ensure that models of this nature are correctly identified, 
equation 1 (the selection equation) must contain at least one variable that is absent from 
equation 2 (the quantile regressions) and the selected instruments should have some 
theoretical foundation (Himler, 2001).  In the selection model we include controls for time 
spent abroad and cohabitation status while studying, as clearly these will tend to vary more 
for immigrants and will be unrelated to earnings. Generally our selected identification 
instruments perform well.  
 
Table 7 presents the results from our wage equations for various quantiles of the wage 
distribution. The hypothesis that the costs of mismatch are lower for native graduates is 
tested using interactions between the two key immigrant dummies and the mismatch terms, 
which can then be compared to the mismatch level terms in the model. Given our earlier 
results, we favour the specification that distinguishes immigrants in terms of their length of 
stay within the host country. The wage models are well specified and generally conform to 
expectations. Ignoring distributional aspects of the results for now, we found that males 
                                                     
12  The models are fitting through the semi-nonparametric estimators of Galland & Nychka (1987) using the snp 
procedure in Stata. 
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have higher earnings than females and earnings increase with labour market experience and 
years in higher education. Earnings were found to increase with hours worked and were 
higher for those graduating from prestigious courses, engineering degrees and individuals 
employed in larger firms. Earnings declined with a previous history of unemployment and 
public sector employment. With respect to the mismatch variables, the results are in line 
with those reported by McGuinness and Sloane (2009), with an overeducation pay penalty in 
current employment of over 20 per cent, while overskilling is associated with a lower wage 
cost of approximately 4 to 5 per cent. Crucially, we found that newly arrived immigrant 
graduates incurred a pay penalty, while those domiciled in the host country at aged 16 
earned a premium relative to native graduates. With regard to the interaction terms, we 
found that more newly arrived immigrants who were overskilled incurred a wage 
disadvantage within the low and median ranges of the wage \ human capital distribution, 
however, no differential aspects were observed with regard to either immigrants with longer 
domicile or overeducation The selection terms indicate that newly arrived (established) 
immigrants, a priori, have lower (higher) than expected average earnings by virtue of their 
observable human capital characteristics.  
 
Regarding the distributional aspects of the results, and assuming that an individual’s position 
in the wage distribution reflects their productivity potential, the model suggests that the 
disproportional wage penalty associated with overskilling incurred by newly arrived 
immigrants is restricted to those with low to median levels of human capital.  Newly arrived 
immigrants with above average levels of human capital incur no additional penalty as a 
consequence of becoming mismatched. With respect to the distributional spread of the 
remaining covariates in the model, while most impacts are relatively stable throughout the 
distribution, some notable patterns are evident. For instance, the return to vocational 
programmes and field related employment is only significant within the lower to median 
portions of the wage distribution.   
 
Disaggregating our models by gender, some substantial differences become apparent.  We 
find that within the male distribution (Table 813), the premium to established immigrants is 
positive and rising throughout the wage / human capital distribution, while for newly arrived 
immigrants it is negative only in the upper regions to the wage / human capital distributions. 
Within the female model, the wage penalty for newly arrived immigrants is relatively 
persistent throughout, while a pay premium is only evident for long-term immigrants at the 
very top of the wage\human capital distribution.  Regarding the immigrant \ mismatch 
interactions, the results indicate that newly arrived male immigrants incur a higher pay 
penalty from overskilling relative to natives.  Within the female distribution (Table 914), 
                                                     
13  For the purposes of brevity, we report only the key coefficients.  Full results are available from the authors 
on request.  
14 For the purposes of brevity, we report only the key coefficients.  Full results are available from the authors 
on request.  
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relative to mismatched natives, newly arrived immigrants who are overeducated 
(overskilled) and located at the bottom (top) of the wage \ human capital distribution incur 
larger pay penalties. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
With respect to job satisfaction, respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction 
with their current work on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was very dissatisfied and 5 very 
satisfied; we classify individuals responding 4 or 5 to this question as being job satisfied.   
The model specification approach is similar to that adopted for the wage equations; 
however, as the dependant variable is binary in nature, this rules out the use of quantile 
regression as a control for unobserved heterogeneity.  Furthermore, the estimation of a 
treatment model cannot be easily accommodated with sample size restrictions again ruling 
out the possibility of using PSM in terms of both immigration and mismatch status.  In order 
to account, at least to some extent, for the influences of selection we estimate an 
augmented regression, within which the individual predicted probability of each immigrant 
status is included in the model as an additional covariate (see Card & De La Rica, 2006).   In 
our initial specification we find job satisfaction to be positively related to studying in the 
area of education/humanities, undertaking a course perceived to have a good reputation 
among employers, that is prestigious and vocational in nature, being employed in a job 
related to ones field of study, employed in an R&D intensive firm and working in the public 
sector.  Job satisfaction was inversely related to age, years spent in higher education and 
having experienced a previous spell of unemployment.  We found that being overeducated 
in current employment reduced the likelihood of job satisfaction by almost 20 per cent, with 
the effect considerably larger for overskilling at approximately 30 per cent. Crucially we 
found that immigrants were 7 per cent less likely to be job satisfied, with this effect almost 
exclusively driven by a 14 per cent lower probability of job satisfaction among more recent 
immigrants (Specification 2).   When we introduce our interaction terms we do not find that 
mismatch status among immigrant workers exacerbates the already substantial effects of 
either overeducation or overskilling (Specification 3).  
 
When we estimate the models separately by gender (specifications 4 and 5), we found no 
evidence of lower job satisfaction among male immigrants and, in fact, established 
overeducated immigrants exhibited a positive interaction effect, which more or less 
eliminated the level effect for overeducation, suggesting that such immigrants do not have 
lower job satisfaction levels relative to matched workers.  It may well be that such workers 
are being compensating for lower earnings associated with overeducation by other positive 
13 
job attributes, such as increased security and / or a greater work life balance.  The situation 
is very different for females with those domiciled (not domiciled) in the host country at aged 
16 found to have a ten (fifteen) per cent lower likelihood of being job satisfied relative to 
native graduates.  While these effects were found not to be exacerbated by the presence of 
either form of mismatch, they represent important findings in their own right and certainly 
provide grounds for further research. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper examines the extent to which immigrant graduates have a higher exposure to 
educational and skill mismatch and the degree to which the previously well documented 
negative impacts of mismatch on earnings and job satisfaction were heightened as a 
consequence of immigrant status.  Contrary to previous research, we found little evidence to 
suggest that immigrants had a higher exposure to overeducation. However, female 
immigrants domiciled in the host country at age 16 were found to have a higher exposure to 
overskilling relative to their native counterparts.  With respect to earnings, the research 
showed that more newly arrived immigrants incurred wage penalties’ which were 
exacerbated by higher levels of penalisation resulting from overskilling in the male labour 
market and overeducation in the female labour market.  Established immigrants were found 
to enjoy wage premia, particularly within the male labour market, with no evidence of 
disproportionate wage impacts arising as a consequence of mismatch.  In terms of job 
satisfaction, while there was no evidence to suggest that the negative effects of mismatch 
were made worse by immigrant status, we found that female immigrants, particularly newly 
arrived, had a much lower likelihood of being satisfied in their jobs relative to their native 
counterparts.   
 
The research presented here is unique in terms of its robustness given that it is free from 
many of the biases usually associated with studies of immigrant workers within the labour 
market, in addition, the integrity of the results was also ensured with additional checks for 
the effects of both sample selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1:  Graduate Mismatch levels in Current Employment by Country 
 Overeducation Overskilling 
Italy 0.13 0.11 
Spain 0.17 0.15 
France 0.04 0.14 
Austria 0.10 0.08 
Germany 0.05 0.09 
Netherlands 0.07 0.09 
UK 0.14 0.14 
Finland 0.06 0.07 
Norway 0.03 0.04 
Portugal 0.06 0.03 
Belgium 0.02 0.08 
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Table 2: Overeducation Probit (Marginal effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Spec1 Spec1 Spec1 
    
Overedjob1 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Overskilljob1 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
male 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Labour exp -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years HE -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Humanities -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Social -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Science -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Engineering -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unemploy hist 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
migrant -0.00   
 (0.007)   
Estab migrant  0.00  
  (0.008)  
New migrant  -0.01  
  (0.012)  
EU 15   -0.00 
   (0.010) 
EU other   0.03 
   (0.023) 
High income   -0.05 
   (0.030) 
Rest of world   0.00 
   (0.010) 
Course employer 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Course prestige  -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Vocational course  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Fieldmatchnow -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Fieldrelatednow -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Hours -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Firm -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
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Size 50-99 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size 100-249 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size 250-999 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Size 1000+ -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Public sector -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
N of employers 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Supervisor -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Italy 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spain 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
France -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Austria 0.02** 0.02** 0.02*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Netherlands -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
UK -0.02** -0.02** -0.01** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Finland -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Norway -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Portugal 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Belgium -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.394 0.394 0.395 
Observations 13,342 13,342 13,342 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Overeducation Probit by Gender (Marginal effects for selected variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male 1 Male 2 Male 3 Female 1 Female 2 Female 3 
       
Overedjob1 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overskilljob1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
migrant -0.00   -0.00   
 (0.010)   (0.008)   
Estab migrant  0.00   0.00  
  (0.012)   (0.010)  
New migrant  -0.01   -0.01  
  (0.018)   (0.016)  
EU 15   -0.03   0.01 
   (0.023)   (0.012) 
EU other   0.03   0.03 
   (0.034)   (0.030) 
High income   -0.04   -0.06 
   (0.037)   (0.046) 
Rest of world   0.01   -0.01 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
       
       
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.393 0.395 0.40 0.40 0.40 
Observations 5,251 5,251 5,251 8,091 8,091 8,091 
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Table 4: Overskilling Probit (Marginal Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Spec1 Spec1 Spec1 
    
Overedjob1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Overskilljob1 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
male 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Labour exp -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years HE 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Humanities -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Social -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Science 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Engineering 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Unemploy hist 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
migrant 0.03***   
 (0.009)   
Estab migrant  0.03***  
  (0.011)  
New migrant  0.02  
  (0.017)  
EU 15   0.03** 
   (0.014) 
EU other   0.01 
   (0.042) 
High income   0.03 
   (0.029) 
Rest of world   0.02* 
   (0.014) 
Course employer -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Course prestige  -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Vocational course  -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fieldmatchnow -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Fieldrelatednow -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Hours -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Firm -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Size 50-99 -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Size 100-249 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 250-999 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 1000+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public sector -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
N of employers 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Supervisor -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Spain 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
France -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Austria -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Netherlands -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
UK -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Finland -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Norway -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Portugal -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Belgium -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant -0.06** -0.06** -0.06** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Observations 13,342 13,342 13,342 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Overskilling by Gender (Marginal effects for selected variables) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male 1 Male 2 Male 3 Female 1 Female 2 Female 3 
       
Overedjob1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Overskilljob1 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
migrant 0.00   0.04***   
 (0.018)   (0.011)   
Estab migrant  0.02   0.04***  
  (0.021)   (0.013)  
New migrant  -0.03   0.04**  
  (0.031)   (0.019)  
EU 15   0.02   0.03** 
   (0.026)   (0.016) 
High income   0.01   0.05 
   (0.048)   (0.035) 
Rest of world   -0.01   0.04** 
   (0.027)   (0.016) 
EU other      0.04 
      (0.044) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.259 0.259 0.259 0.282 0.283 0.283 
Observations 5,251 5,251 5,240 8,091 8,091 8,091 
` Standard errors in parentheses 
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Results of Propensity Score Models 
 Overeducated 
Current Job 
Overskilled 
Current Job 
   
All Immigrant Workers -0.02 0.044** 
 (0.02) (0.021) 
   
Immigrant Males 0.000 0.042 
 (0.029) (0.032) 
   
Immigrant Females -0.007 0.045* 
 (0.025) (0.027) 
   
   
T-Statistics in parentheses 
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Table 7: Quantile Wage Equations:  All Employees 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Q .2 Q .4 Q .5 Q .7 Q .9 
      
Overedjob1 -0.02* -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Overskilljob1 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Overed now -0.26*** -0.27*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Overskilled  now -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.04** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
Overed*estab mig 0.11 0.06 0.13* 0.12 -0.02 
 (0.096) (0.076) (0.074) (0.082) (0.104) 
Oversk*estab mig 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.080) (0.064) (0.062) (0.069) (0.088) 
Overed*new mig 0.18 0.08 -0.03 -0.24* -0.05 
 (0.165) (0.132) (0.127) (0.142) (0.181) 
Oversk*new mig -0.38*** -0.44*** -0.38*** -0.16 -0.12 
 (0.132) (0.105) (0.101) (0.113) (0.144) 
male 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Labour exp 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Years HE 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Humanities 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Social 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Science 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.03* 
 (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
Engineering 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) 
Unemploy hist -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Estab migrant 0.39 0.44** 0.65*** 0.95*** 1.32*** 
 (0.268) (0.214) (0.207) (0.231) (0.293) 
New migrant -0.30 -1.11*** -1.33*** -1.86*** -2.01*** 
 (0.465) (0.371) (0.358) (0.400) (0.508) 
Course employer 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Course prestige  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Vocational course  0.03*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Fieldmatchnow -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) 
Fieldrelatednow 0.02 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02* -0.00 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Hours 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
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R&D Firm 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.02** 0.02*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Size 50-99 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.02 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
Size 100-249 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) 
Size 250-999 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) 
Size 1000+ 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
Public sector -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
N of employers -0.01*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Supervisor 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Italy -0.70*** -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.59*** -0.51*** 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) 
Spain -0.76*** -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.62*** -0.54*** 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) 
France -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.30*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) 
Austria -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.20*** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024) 
Netherlands -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.21*** 
 (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
UK -0.17*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.02 0.07*** 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) 
Finland -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.23*** 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) 
Norway 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) 
Portugal -0.93*** -0.91*** -0.87*** -0.83*** -0.77*** 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.034) 
Belgium -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.21*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.025) 
oldmills -0.11 0.01 -0.13 -0.35* -0.21 
 (0.220) (0.175) (0.169) (0.189) (0.240) 
oldmills2 0.24* 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.88*** 
 (0.135) (0.108) (0.104) (0.116) (0.148) 
newmills -0.70* 0.12 0.33 0.77** 0.48 
 (0.400) (0.319) (0.308) (0.344) (0.436) 
newmills2 -0.95*** -0.80*** -0.79*** -0.80*** -1.32*** 
 (0.316) (0.252) (0.243) (0.272) (0.345) 
Constant 6.30*** 7.25*** 7.45*** 8.01*** 8.19*** 
 (0.435) (0.347) (0.335) (0.374) (0.475) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.407 0.394 0.381 0.340 0.278 
Observations 12,622 12,622 12,622 12,622 12,622 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Quantile Wage Equations (selected coefficients):  Males 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Q .2 Q .4 Q .5 Q .7 Q .0 
      
      
Overedjob1 -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019) (0.024) 
Overskilljob1 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.021) 
Overed now -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.033) 
Overskilled  now -0.02 -0.05** -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) 
Overed*estab mig 0.04 -0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.28 
 (0.164) (0.142) (0.128) (0.154) (0.196) 
Oversk*estab mig 0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.11 -0.43*** 
 (0.134) (0.116) (0.104) (0.126) (0.160) 
Overed*new mig 0.04 -0.00 -0.17 0.08 -0.08 
 (0.218) (0.189) (0.170) (0.205) (0.260) 
Oversk*new mig -0.74*** -0.45** -0.53*** -0.84*** -0.31 
 (0.218) (0.189) (0.169) (0.205) (0.260) 
Estab migrant 0.66* 0.96*** 0.82*** 1.00*** 1.31*** 
 (0.359) (0.311) (0.279) (0.337) (0.427) 
New migrant -0.08 -0.62 -1.13** -0.66 -1.93** 
 (0.679) (0.589) (0.528) (0.638) (0.809) 
 (0.297) (0.258) (0.231) (0.279) (0.354) 
oldmills2 0.22 0.28* 0.31** 0.38** 0.69*** 
 (0.170) (0.147) (0.132) (0.160) (0.203) 
newmills -1.10* -0.50 0.26 -0.65 0.94 
 (0.610) (0.529) (0.474) (0.573) (0.727) 
newmills2 -1.19** -1.02** -0.65* -1.34*** -0.75 
 (0.463) (0.401) (0.360) (0.435) (0.552) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.399 0.381 0.368 0.334 0.267 
Observations 5,018 5,018 5,018 5,018 5,018 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Quantile Wage Equations (selected coefficients):  Females 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Q .2 Q .4 Q .5 Q .7 Q .0 
      
Overedjob1 -0.02 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
Overskilljob1 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) 
Overed now -0.25*** -0.27*** -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.19*** 
 (0.023) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) 
Overskilled  now -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.022) 
Overed*estab mig 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.11 -0.04 
 (0.118) (0.093) (0.093) (0.096) (0.122) 
Oversk*estab mig 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 
 (0.101) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081) (0.103) 
Overed*new mig 0.21 -0.26 -0.26 -0.47** -0.55** 
 (0.245) (0.191) (0.193) (0.197) (0.251) 
Oversk*new mig -0.44** 0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.172) (0.135) (0.135) (0.139) (0.176) 
Estab migrant 0.18 -0.11 -0.02 0.48 1.30*** 
 (0.431) (0.337) (0.340) (0.348) (0.443) 
New migrant -0.61 -1.29** -1.28** -2.03*** -2.57*** 
 (0.642) (0.502) (0.505) (0.518) (0.658) 
oldmills -0.05 0.43 0.37 0.01 -0.07 
 (0.337) (0.264) (0.266) (0.272) (0.346) 
oldmills2 0.15 0.45** 0.44** 0.44** 1.03*** 
 (0.235) (0.184) (0.185) (0.190) (0.241) 
newmills -0.07 0.48 0.52 0.98** 0.33 
 (0.523) (0.409) (0.412) (0.422) (0.536) 
newmills2 -0.57 -0.60* -0.57* -0.70** -1.99*** 
 (0.435) (0.340) (0.343) (0.351) (0.446) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.402 0.372 0.353 0.306 0.253 
Observations 7,604 7,604 7,604 7,604 7,604 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Job Satisfaction Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Spec1 Spec2 Spec3 Male Female 
      
Overedjob1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017) 
Overskilljob1 -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017) 
Overed now -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.023) 
Overskilled  now -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.27*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) (0.022) 
overed*Estab migrant   0.12 0.31 0.06 
   (0.098) (0.193) (0.117) 
overskill*Estab migrant   -0.01 -0.11 0.03 
   (0.085) (0.157) (0.101) 
Overed*new migrant   0.01 -0.06 0.02 
   (0.205) (0.291) (0.284) 
Oversk*new migrant   -0.15  -0.04 
   (0.157)  (0.182) 
male -0.02* -0.02* -0.01   
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)   
Labour exp 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00** 0.00 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
age -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Years HE -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
Humanities 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05* 0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.030) (0.017) 
Social 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.024) (0.016) 
Science 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.022) 
Engineering -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) 
Unemploy hist -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03* -0.03** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.013) 
migrant -0.07***     
 (0.023)     
Estab migrant  -0.04 -0.05* 0.03 -0.10** 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.054) (0.039) 
New migrant  -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.09 -0.14*** 
  (0.039) (0.041) (0.068) (0.051) 
Course employer 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) 
Course prestige  0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) 
Vocational course  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.013) 
Fieldmatchnow 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04* 0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.020) 
Fieldrelatednow 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.017) 
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Hours 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D Firm 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) 
Size 50-99 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) (0.022) 
Size 100-249 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) 
Size 250-999 -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) (0.017) 
Size 1000+ 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.015) 
Public sector 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) 
N of employers 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Supervisor 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.01 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) 
Italy -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.09** -0.11*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.043) (0.040) 
Spain -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.036) (0.033) 
France -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.040) (0.034) 
Austria 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.02 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.035) (0.035) 
Netherlands -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08** -0.07** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.029) 
UK -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.14** -0.12** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.059) (0.048) 
Finland -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.07* -0.10*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.037) (0.034) 
Norway -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.08*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.030) 
Portugal -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.15*** -0.14** -0.14*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.047) 
Belgium -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) (0.039) 
scores   0.50 1.44* 0.35 
   (0.486) (0.824) (0.621) 
Constant 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.20** 0.28*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.101) (0.070) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.095 0.093 
Observations 13,342 13,342 13,342 5,246 8,091 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Data Appendix  
 
 
Table A1: Distribution of Immigrant Population by Country 
Country of birth of respondent Freq. Percent 
Germany 49 9.88 
France 24 4.84 
Greece 21 4.23 
Suriname 21 4.23 
Sweden 21 4.23 
Italy 19 3.83 
united states 19 3.83 
Ireland 18 3.63 
Switzerland 18 3.63 
morocco 14 2.82 
united kingdom 13 2.62 
Belgium 12 2.42 
India 11 2.22 
Poland 11 2.22 
Venezuela 11 2.22 
turkey 10 2.02 
Iran 9 1.81 
Korea, south 9 1.81 
Denmark 8 1.61 
Netherlands 8 1.61 
Russia 8 1.61 
Vietnam 8 1.61 
Netherlands antilles 7 1.41 
Romania 7 1.41 
south Africa 6 1.21 
Canada 5 1.01 
Israel 5 1.01 
Australia 4 0.81 
china 4 0.81 
Hong Kong 4 0.81 
Iceland 4 0.81 
Spain 4 0.81 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 0.6 
Finland 3 0.6 
Gibraltar 3 0.6 
Hungary 3 0.6 
Japan 3 0.6 
Kenya 3 0.6 
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Luxembourg 3 0.6 
Mauritius 3 0.6 
Tunisia 3 0.6 
Andorra 2 0.4 
Argentina 2 0.4 
Bangladesh 2 0.4 
brazil 2 0.4 
cote d ivoire 2 0.4 
Croatia 2 0.4 
Cyprus 2 0.4 
Estonia 2 0.4 
Ghana 2 0.4 
Latvia 2 0.4 
Monaco 2 0.4 
Nepal 2 0.4 
New Zealand 2 0.4 
Nigeria 2 0.4 
Philippines 2 0.4 
Portugal 2 0.4 
Singapore 2 0.4 
Slovakia 2 0.4 
Ukraine 2 0.4 
united Arab emirates 2 0.4 
Zambia 2 0.4 
Afghanistan 1 0.2 
Aruba 1 0.2 
Austria 1 0.2 
Belize 1 0.2 
Bermuda 1 0.2 
Bolivia 1 0.2 
Bulgaria 1 0.2 
Cambodia 1 0.2 
cape Verde 1 0.2 
Colombia 1 0.2 
Congo, democratic republic of the 1 0.2 
Czech republic 1 0.2 
Eritrea 1 0.2 
French Guiana 1 0.2 
Georgia 1 0.2 
Honduras 1 0.2 
Indonesia 1 0.2 
Iraq 1 0.2 
jersey 1 0.2 
Kazakhstan 1 0.2 
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Kuwait 1 0.2 
Lebanon 1 0.2 
Madagascar 1 0.2 
Malaysia 1 0.2 
Mauritania 1 0.2 
Mexico 1 0.2 
Norway 1 0.2 
Oman 1 0.2 
Pakistan 1 0.2 
Peru 1 0.2 
Slovenia 1 0.2 
Sudan 1 0.2 
Thailand 1 0.2 
Uganda 1 0.2 
western Sahara 1 0.2 
 496 99.83 
 
 
  
33 
Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Overedjob1 15005 0.17 0.38 
overskillj~1 15005 0.19 0.39 
male 15005 0.38 0.49 
Labour exp 13991 52.75 13.87 
age 14543 30.08 3.85 
Humanities 15005 0.20 0.40 
Social 15005 0.30 0.46 
Science 15005 0.12 0.32 
Engineering 15005 0.16 0.37 
Unemploy hist 15005 0.36 0.48 
immigrant 15005 0.03 0.18 
Course employer 15005 0.40 0.49 
Course prestige  15005 0.35 0.48 
Vocational course  15005 0.40 0.49 
fieldmatch~w 15005 0.30 0.46 
fieldrelat~w 15005 0.54 0.50 
Hours 14888 36.39 8.01 
R&D Firm 15005 0.40 0.49 
Size 50-99 15005 0.08 0.27 
Size 100-249 15005 0.10 0.30 
Size 250-999 15005 0.15 0.35 
Size 1000+ 15005 0.37 0.48 
Public sector 15005 0.43 0.50 
N of employers 14439 2.34 2.22 
Supervisor 15005 0.32 0.47 
Italy 15005 0.10 0.30 
Spain 15005 0.17 0.37 
France 15005 0.07 0.26 
Austria 15005 0.06 0.23 
Netherlands 15005 0.15 0.36 
UK 15005 0.08 0.26 
Finland 15005 0.10 0.30 
Norway 15005 0.11 0.31 
Portugal 15005 0.02 0.15 
Belgium 15005 0.07 0.25 
Germany 15005 0.07 0.26 
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Table A3: Variable Definitions 
 
Lwage   Gross monthly earnings in main employment logged. 
Overednow:   Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in current job and 
 zero otherwise 
Overedjob1:   Dummy variable takes value 1 if overeducated in first job and zero 
 otherwise 
Overskillnow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in current job and zero 
otherwise 
Overskilljob1:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if overskilled in first job and zero 
 otherwise 
Male:   Dummy variable takes value 1 if Male and zero otherwise 
Labour exp  Number of months employed since graduation 
age:   Age in years 
Years HE:  Years spent in Higher Education 
Humanities:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Humanities 
and zero otherwise 
Social:   Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Social 
 Science and zero otherwise 
Science:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Science and 
zero otherwise 
Engineering:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if main field of study was Engineering 
and zero otherwise 
Supervisor:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if supervised staff members and zero 
otherwise 
Fieldmatchnow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched exclusively to 
field of study and zero otherwise 
Fieldrelatednow:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if current job matched on own or a    
 related field of study and zero otherwise 
Course employer:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employers were familiar with course 
and zero otherwise 
Course prestige:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was academically prestigious 
and zero otherwise 
Vocational course:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if course was vocationally and zero 
otherwise 
Hours:  Regular contract hours per week 
R&Dfirm:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a research intensive firm 
and zero otherwise 
Size 50-99:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 50 to 99 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size 100-249: Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 100 to 249 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size 250-999:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with 250 to 999 
workers and zero otherwise 
Size 1000+:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a firm with over 1000 
workers and zero otherwise 
Public sector:  Dummy variable takes value 1 if employed in a public sector 
organisation and zero otherwise 
N of employers:  Number of employers since graduation
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